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█ Abstract This contribution aims to address epistemological issues at the crossroads of philosophy of sci-
ence and psychiatry by reflecting on the notions of organization and resilience. Referring to the debate on 
the notion of “organization” and its explanatory relevance in philosophical neo-mechanistic theories, I 
consider how such positions hold up when tentatively applied to  the mental health context. More specifi-
cally, I show how reflections on psychiatric resilience, cognitive reserve, and accommodation strategies 
challenge attempts to embrace a mechanistic perspective on mental disorders. A deeper focus on these 
aspects of mental health is relevant to theoretical discussions on explanatory models as well as for clinical 
practice, diagnosis, and treatment.  
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█ Riassunto Il ruolo esplicativo dell’organizzazione e la resilienza psichiatrica: sfide ad un approccio meccani-
cistico alla malattia mentale – Questo articolo intende discutere alcuni temi epistemologici all’incrocio tra 
la filosofia della scienza e la psichiatria, riflettendo sulle nozioni di organizzazione e resilienza. Muovendo 
dalle riflessioni sulla nozione di “organizzazione” sviluppate nell’ambito delle teorie neo-meccaniciste, e 
dalla difesa del suo ruolo esplicativo, il lavoro analizza la possibilità di estendere alcune posizioni relative 
alla spiegazione scientifica al contesto delle scienze della salute mentale. Più nello specifico, si illustra co-
me le indagini sulla resilienza psichiatrica, la riserva cognitiva e le strategie di compensazione possano 
mettere in discussione i tentativi di abbracciare una prospettiva meccanicistica quando si affronta il tema 
del disturbo psichiatrico. Una maggiore attenzione ai suddetti filoni di ricerca può avere un impatto signi-
ficativo sia sulla discussione relativa ai modelli teorici di spiegazione della malattia mentale sia sui proces-
si clinici di diagnosi e terapia.  
PAROLE CHIAVE: Resilienza psichiatrica; Riserva cognitiva; Organizzazione; Meccanicismo 
 

 
█  Introduction: Disorders and the notion of 
organization 
 
THE PRESENT WORK FOCUSES ON the possi-
ble role of psychiatric resilience and cognitive 
reserve in mechanistic explanations for men-
tal disorders, and how they might influence 
our understanding of organization as an ex-
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planatory principle. I do not take a stance 
here on precisely what a psychiatric disorder 
may ultimately be. While this is surely an ex-
tremely important issue that relates to the 
current discussion, it is not the core concern 
of the reflections that follow, which instead 
aim to discuss thorny issues related to mech-
anistic explanations of mental disorders. For 
the purposes of this contribution, let me just 
mention several broadly accepted definitions 
of mental disorders in the literature. Accord-
ing to Jerome Wakefield, «a disorder is a 
harmful dysfunction, wherein harmful is a 
value term based on social norms, and dys-
function is a scientific term referring to the 
failure of a mental mechanism to perform a 
natural function for which it was designed by 
evolution».1 For Dominic Murphy, «mental 
illnesses are caused by distinctive pathophys-
iological processes in the brain»; they «are 
destructive processes taking place in biologi-
cal systems», and «a particular destructive 
process is the way the disease occurs in hu-
mans».2 These definitions refer to mental 
disorders as dysfunctional or destructive: dis-
eases (and psychiatric diseases in particular) 
are characterized as “dysfunctional”, “de-
structive” insofar as they contrast with some 
standard or the “normal” functioning of the 
systems at stake. 
Epistemological reflections on psychiatric 
disorders, and related concerns about psychi-
atric nosologies and explanations, have prolif-
erated over the last few years. Major concerns 
include the variability of classifications – as 
shown by different versions of DSM – and dif-
ficulties in elaborating explanations which en-
compass the heterogeneous range of factors 
involved. Some recent views in the literature 
have appealed to the notion of mechanism, in 
order to provide scientific support for a more 
advanced and stable nosology based on causal 
explanatory accounts of diseases. The search 
for causes, and an understanding of their mu-
tual interactions within a mechanism, is in-
voked to reduce the variability of such defini-
tions and to provide improved nosology. The 
aim is to go beyond purely symptomatic ac-
counts and align psychiatry with the rest of 
medicine. This trend is not only evident in the 
philosophical literature,3 but also finds some 
advocates within psychiatry itself. Comment-
ing on the so-called Research Domain Criteria 
Project initiative,4 for instance, eminent psy-
chiatrists such as Thomas Insel and Bruce 
Cuthbert have stressed that investigations are 
to be pursued «from molecular factors to so-
cial determinants – to understand normal and 
abnormal behaviour, based on a deep under-
standing of mechanisms»,5 and that we should 
develop «a more mechanistic understanding of 
how such factors as life events and the social 
environment interact with development to 
produce a range of observed outcomes».6 
Psychiatric diseases can be represented as 
complex systems that can be described at nu-
merous levels,7 including, for instance, genetic, 
neurophysiologic, psychological, social, and 
economic factors. The standard interactions 
between factors that normally ensure socially 
acceptable behaviour no longer hold; instead, 
divergent arrangements between interacting 
parts underlie changed behaviour, which is 
regarded as pathological. If diseases follow a 
course – from aetiology to the onset of symp-
toms, to healing/chronicity/death – there 
must be some overall functioning of the sys-
tem that – following the definitions noted 
above – is responsible for global non-
functioning, some kind of destructive or dys-
functional behaviour. In other terms, when 
considering pathologies as mechanisms, we 
are considering them as systems that disrupt 
the orchestrated functioning of our organism, 
or of parts of it, and the resulting behavioural 
outcomes. Some understanding of how this 
occurs must be part of the explanatory pro-
cesses for diseases, understood as conditions 
which threaten to disrupt forms of stability 
and equilibrium in the standard functioning 
of the organism. An explanation of a disease 
should reveal the factors that contribute to pa-
thology as a system, insofar as this system is 
dysfunctional with respect to the organism 
considered to be in a condition of health. In 
the following section, we will consider the role 
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the notion of “organization” plays in mecha-
nistic perspectives when elaborating explana-
tory accounts of a well-functioning system. 
 
█  1 The explanatory role of organization 
 
The idea of organization appears to be 
crucial to various theories that have found 
broad consensus in the philosophy of science, 
and the very definitions of mechanism they 
put forward. Let us consider some: «Mecha-
nisms are entities and activities organized 
such that they are productive of regular 
changes from start-up to finish or termina-
tion conditions»;8 «A mechanism is a struc-
ture performing a function in virtue of its 
component parts, component operations and 
their organization. The orchestrated func-
tioning of the mechanism is responsible for 
one or more phenomena»;9 «A mechanism 
for a phenomenon consists of entities (or 
parts) whose activities and interactions are 
organized so as to be responsible for the phe-
nomenon».10 In other terms, the behaviour 
of a mechanistic system as a whole depends 
on the exact way in which component parts 
act and mutually interact. Not only does the 
notion of organization appear in such defini-
tions, it also helps explain a range of qualita-
tive differences in the performance of active 
roles within a system. Levy and Bechtel, in 
particular, claim that «organization involves 
an internal division of causal labor whereby 
different components perform different causal 
roles».11 A specific contribution to mechanis-
tic functioning is thus related to a specific 
mode of organization. Whenever (a) different 
components of the system make different 
contributions to behaviour, and (b) the dif-
ferential contributions of these components 
are integrated, exhibiting specific interde-
pendencies, we have organization. Given the 
role it plays in definitions of mechanisms, 
and the explanatory aims of mechanistic ac-
counts, organization is considered to be cru-
cial to scientific explanation. 
Organization implies a specific division of 
labour among the variables involved, and is 
important not only with respect to intralevel 
functioning, which depends on the properties 
of entities (or parts), their structures, and 
their modes of interaction, but also with re-
spect to constitutive explanations, which 
concern interlevel relations. Its explanatory 
role is directly addressed, in How organiza-
tion explains, by Jaakko Kuorikoski and Petri 
Ylikoski, who state: «Constitutive mechanis-
tic explanations explain a property of a whole 
with the properties of its parts and their or-
ganization».12 To capture both the explana-
tory relevance of the causal properties of 
parts and the organizational aspect of mech-
anistic explanations, Kuorikoski and Ylikoski 
elaborate on the notion of organization, 
identifying a range of different dimensions 
according to which it can be characterized. 
This leads to a typology of organizational 
dependence meant to better account for or-
ganizational interactions. The three dimen-
sions they suggest for evaluating organiza-
tion are: diversity in the kinds of compo-
nents; the network structure between the 
components; and diversity in the kinds of re-
lations. As for diversity in relations, they 
claim that the properties of the interactions 
between the parts include duration, rate, in-
hibition, promotion, and modulation, among 
others. These properties of the relations be-
tween parts are held to be explanatory with 
respect to system-level behaviour if we can 
link changes in the specific properties of such 
relations to some specific change in system-
level properties. 
As is widely known, in the last few dec-
ades, a debate over mechanisms has been 
prominent in philosophical discussions on 
scientific explanation and scientific practice. 
The psychiatric sciences have not been im-
mune to the considerable success of these 
neo-mechanistic accounts. As already noted 
in Section 1, some of the appeal of mechanis-
tic notions is their potential for providing 
more stable descriptions and classifications. 
Associating psychiatric diseases with under-
lying mechanisms could, in principle, allow 
us to implement causal explanations and 
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thereby offer more reliable and enduring def-
initions and nosology. However, while the 
appeal to mechanisms, interacting entities 
and levels, and their organization provides 
some valuable epistemological tools, it also 
opens up a broad range of concerns. If a sys-
tem’s functioning is warranted by its organi-
zation, we must first and foremost ask: what 
organization is relevant for understanding 
disorders? What does organization exactly 
explain, and what does it not explain, if the 
relevant organization is far from clear? How 
fine-grained does our account of organiza-
tion have to be in order for it to be explana-
torily significant? And, in the end, what is or-
ganization explanatorily relevant for? 
As mentioned above, the notion of organ-
ization can play a double role in relation to: 
(i) the mutual intralevel interactions among 
entities involved; (ii)  the hierarchical consti-
tution of the system. Kuorikoski and Yli-
koski have stated that organizational expla-
nation is facilitated by looking for ways in 
which the organization itself can be consid-
ered to rely on components that are almost 
independent, while Craver has claimed that 
«organization is the inter-level relation be-
tween a mechanism as a whole and its com-
ponents. Lower-level components are made 
up into higher-level components by organiz-
ing them spatially, temporally and actively 
into something greater than the mere sum of 
parts».13 It is worth considering whether this 
conception in which component parts are or-
ganized into some appropriate whole, yet 
remain localizable and epistemically decom-
posed, is (always) suitable for psychiatric ex-
planations and which aspects of psychiatric 
disorders are significant when discussing the 
explanatory role of organization. Organiza-
tion is taken as implying some specific form 
of dependence, which is held to be responsi-
ble for some global effect of interest. Discov-
ering the organization of intertwined factors 
would greatly advance our understanding of 
mental disorders. However, in most cases, 
the precise nature of mutual relations be-
tween the elements involved may remain 
somewhat opaque. To address explanatory 
issues, and the kinds of stability that actually 
matter for both explanatory accounts and 
clinical concerns, let us now turn to some re-
cent mental health studies on cognitive re-
serve and psychiatric resilience. 
 
█  2 Cognitive reserve and psychiatric resili-
ence 
 
In this section, I zoom in on two concepts 
that, I believe, deserve deeper attention in 
the philosophy of psychiatry and provide 
some interesting epistemological challenges: 
“cognitive reserve” and “psychiatric resili-
ence”. While sometimes addressed together, 
they are often discussed separately and their 
descriptions do not always overlap. I will 
consider some recent work on cognitive re-
serve and psychiatric resilience and suggest 
some possible theoretical consequences of 
this work for the concept of organization and 
its role in scientific explanation.  
In addition to the individual variations 
that frequently characterize patients, psychi-
atric approaches take personal accommoda-
tion and compensation strategies into ac-
count. These are capacities that might – or 
might not – be activated and interfere with 
the expression of a pathology, to the point of 
preserving – to different extents and in differ-
ent ways – cognitive capacities otherwise at 
risk. Resistance, accommodation and com-
pensation are responses that do not fully re-
establish healthy conditions, nor are they acti-
vated whenever any disrupting factor is pre-
sent. Furthermore, they may manifest in dif-
fering ways. Concepts such as “cognitive re-
serve” or “neural compensation” have been 
introduced to «account for the frequent dis-
crepancy between an individual’s measured 
level of brain pathology and her expected cog-
nitive performance».14 They are discussed as 
compensatory and neuroprotective factors, 
and considered particularly relevant for dis-
eases related to various kinds of brain dam-
age.15 Cognitive reserve stands for differences 
in cognitive processing due to intellectual ac-
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tivity over a lifetime and other environmen-
tal factors. It is invoked to explain differen-
tial susceptibility to functional impairment 
due to a pathology or, more generally, neuro-
logical impairment. Cognitive reserve is un-
derstood to work via neural compensation, 
that is, by utilizing alternative brain networks 
than those usually engaged for cognitive per-
formance in standard healthy conditions. A 
wide range of life experiences is considered 
to contribute to more efficient individual 
cognitive processing, including levels of edu-
cational and occupational attainment (years 
of education, vocabulary, literacy, …) and en-
gagement in leisure and social activities. This 
suggests that neural activity in the present 
moment has been shaped by the quality of 
individual cognitive exposures and/or activi-
ties across the lifespan. Chanraud and col-
leagues, for instance, describe cases where 
people who have stopped drinking alcohol 
still have very clear signs of damage in the 
frontal lobe yet score normally in memory 
tests. Neuroimaging evidence suggests that in 
such cases the brain compensates for its defi-
cits by recruiting a different pathway to per-
form a given cognitive task.16 Others have 
reported evidence in support of the fact that 
a significant number of elderly people (over 
85), whose scans suggest Alzheimer’s, do not 
show any of the symptoms.17 What we have, 
in general, are non-systematic differences in the 
relations between brain damage and function-
al outcomes: cognitive reserve refers to the 
capacity of the brain to cope with pathology 
by finding alternative ways to get things done. 
Although, cross-sectional studies also indicate 
that volumetric changes can occur due to pro-
longed periods of intellectual stimulation – 
typically associated with higher education 
and/or specialized occupational skills – cogni-
tive reserve and accommodation are unlikely 
to be associated with discrete, fully localizable 
features of the human brain.  
Cognitive reserve and neural compensa-
tion are introduced to explain why patients 
with relatively similar conditions may never-
theless exhibit very different functional pro-
files; these constructs can be used as a predic-
tive index for cognitive and psychosocial be-
haviour, but also impact definitions and diag-
nostics. In the diagnostic setting, we might fo-
cus on performance in cognitive tests or, in-
stead, rely on imaging results to explain indi-
vidual differences that help preserve cognitive 
function in the presence of brain pathologies. 
For instance, in studies of dementia, «the 
brain reserve capacity (BRC) hypothesis ar-
gues that this capacity derives from an indi-
vidual’s unique neural profile (e.g., cell count, 
synaptic connections, brain volume, etc.). 
Complimentarily, the cognitive reserve (CR) 
hypothesis emphasizes inter-individual differ-
ences in the effective recruitment of neural net-
works and cognitive processes to compensate 
for age-related effects or pathology».18  
Cognitive reserve is usually a silent capaci-
ty that happens to be called upon when need-
ed. Issues addressed in the literature include 
difficulties in understanding how cognitive 
reserve is modulated, and how to measure 
and, possibly, quantify it experimentally.19 In 
fact, studies often rely heavily on the use of 
proxy measures, such as, e.g., premorbid IQ, 
education, and occupation. Here, confounders 
related to data collection are clearly a prob-
lem. It may be difficult to measure levels of 
education, occupational roles, and leisure ac-
tivity rates in a uniform fashion, while addi-
tional factors (e.g., lifestyles and eating habits) 
may also modulate individual predispositions 
to cognitive disorders. This further hinders our 
understanding of whether, how, and to what 
extent certain putative neural processes under-
pin cognitive reserve and contribute to the re-
markable variability in cognitive outcomes seen 
with brain disorders, leading to some caveats 
on the use of proxy measures. Investigations 
often refer to both intelligence research (e.g. on 
the fronto-parietal network20) and socio-
economic factors. Studies on cognitive reserve 
suggest a neurodevelopmental perspective on 
psychiatric disorders, taking a long-term view 
that considers both elements in the patient’s 
past and their prognostic prospects. Debate is 
also flourishing on whether cognitive reserve 
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tends to directly compensate for underlying pa-
thologies, or, rather, slows down neuropatho-
logical processes. 
Some analogous considerations apply if 
we consider the notion of “psychiatric resili-
ence”, defined as «a dynamic process of suc-
cessful adaptation to stressful experiences or 
adversity». Measurement issues abound here 
as well: «while resilience is often operation-
alized as the absence of psychopathology, op-
erationalizing resilience as a continuous out-
come may better capture the wide variation 
in adaptation following adverse events»21 
than thinking in terms of dichotomous out-
comes would allow us to do. Resilience is 
taken to reflect variation in responses to dif-
ferent kinds of stressful life events. Studying 
resilient outcomes not only implies a focus 
on the detrimental results of adverse events, 
but also encourages a deeper and more gen-
eral analysis of the full range of individual 
differences that might be responsible for dif-
ferent degrees of – more or less successful – 
adaptation to stressful events (e.g. being 
fired, getting divorced, …). Studies have been 
carried out to identify protective factors that 
predict sustained good mental health, with 
much interest in predicting outcomes22 and 
modes of interventions aimed at enhancing 
resilience by targeting multiple social and 
lifestyle factors (e.g. co-parent support, good-
quality social relationships, physical exercise, 
...). Here too, studies on resilience address 
different dimensions that impact the capacity 
to resist disruption to the system and remain 
close to standard behaviour. For instance, 
Long and colleagues have investigated how 
resilience may provide protection from alco-
hol use disorders (AUDs), trying to shed light 
on both genetic and environmental causes. 
Horn and colleagues have focused on post-
traumatic stress disorder (PTSD), often trig-
gered by acute stressors, such as trauma, 
tragedy, or significant threat. Their research 
intends to identify the genetic, epigenetic, 
neurochemical, psychosocial, and environ-
mental underpinnings of resilience, and is 
based on the idea that resilience is mediated 
by adaptive changes encompassing several 
environmental factors, neural circuits, nu-
merous neurotransmitters, and molecular 
pathways.23 Studies on neural substrates me-
diating stress responses also include the use of 
animal models, aiming to shed light on poten-
tial avenues for pharmacological interventions 
that could activate resilience processes.24 
However, emerging areas of investigation are 
beginning to develop new strategies, not just 
treat disorders. While the focus is generally on 
pharmacological solutions, they also aim to 
screen the population and identify at-risk 
youth and adults as soon as possible. Resili-
ence enhancing measures involve addressing 
individual, family, and community factors. 
Although often addressed separately – as 
in most of the studies cited above – the no-
tions of cognitive reserve and psychiatric re-
silience belong to a family of related notions, 
whose definitions, boundaries, and mutual 
relations are not very precisely defined or 
distinct. As pointed out by Watson and 
Joyce,25 a whole range of notions and multi-
dimensional constructs can be recalled – such 
as cognitive reserve, brain reserve, neural re-
serve, neural compensation, and brain 
maintenance. Recent studies on neural plas-
ticity show how active engagement of cogni-
tive processes can modify synaptic structure 
and function even after the age when the 
brain is fully developed, shaping the neural 
networks, which in turn mediate cognitive 
functions so as to use them most efficiently. 
Debate and puzzles remain concerning the 
mismatch between analogous underlying 
conditions and diverse cognitive perfor-
mances. How do cognitive reserve and psy-
chiatric resilience modulate the impacts of 
neurodegeneration? This question was origi-
nally tackled largely in dementia studies, but 
later extended to research on, e.g., multiple 
sclerosis, acquired brain damage, schizo-
phrenia and affective disorders. An addition-
al question of considerable epistemological 
interest is how these factors should influence 
our modes of explanation, and our under-
standing of what counts as explanatorily rel-
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evant in accounting for mental disorders? 
«Resilience is a factor that must be evaluated 
in every patient and that shall help us deter-
mine the outcome of psychiatric disorders 
and will also be a determinant in the occur-
rence of relapses».26 
 
█  3 Reflections on explanatory practice: What 
do organization and resilience explain? 
 
A mechanistic perspective on cognitive 
reserve and psychiatric resilience can, I be-
lieve, stimulate various engaging reflections 
on their explanatory significance, and psy-
chiatric explanatory practices more generally. 
The first question worth addressing is: what 
kind of organization is actually relevant from 
an explanatory standpoint? The idea of or-
ganization as identifying a particular division 
of highly specific causal labour among parts 
in a mechanistic system is unlikely to prove 
fruitful. The idea of pursuing some “division” 
of the systems considered to be engaged by a 
certain behaviour and of identifying specific 
diverse causal labour performed by the indi-
vidual interacting parts – along the lines sug-
gested by, for instance, Levy and Bechtel27 – 
proves problematic. While a specific sort of 
assembly may account for a specific behav-
iour/functioning, clear-cut epistemic decom-
position and/or attempts to specify precise 
localizations and identify discrete steps do not 
look promising, at least for the time being. 
Explaining a certain range of disorders while 
also taking into account reserve/resilience 
implies clarifying why a mismatch occurs be-
tween expected and actual cognitive perfor-
mance, and why the organization of lower-
level components – i.e. the orchestrated func-
tioning of, for instance, strictly genetic and/or 
neurophysiologic elements – may or may not 
per se make a difference to the explanandum. 
Given such a mismatch and the relevant inter-
individual differences that are detected, the 
relation between the functioning of the con-
stituents and global cognitive behaviour still 
remains in question. Even if, in general, organ-
izational explanation is facilitated by consider-
ing a specific organization to be composed of 
semi-independent parts (through some epis-
temic decomposition), it is knowing the specif-
ic organizational dependencies, and their dif-
ferent modes of breaking/resisting, that would 
allow us to better understand how competi-
tion between protective and destructive fac-
tors produces variations in symptoms and 
cognitive performances. Localization and/or 
decomposition do not provide useful epistem-
ic tools to grasp this kind of distributed func-
tionality, nor have effective computational 
explanatory strategies been devised so far. 
Does a focus on cognitive reserve and 
psychiatric resilience affect the very concep-
tion of the explanandum at stake? Are they a 
sort of addendum to the explanation of the 
disorder, or are they part and parcel of the 
explanation itself? What we have is some 
long-term process – including e.g. education 
or occupational achievements – which, 
through some as yet not completely specified 
and understood means, impact neurobiologi-
cal functioning and thereby significantly af-
fect cognitive performance. Variables that 
are described at different levels thus enter the 
picture, with no current notion of cognitive 
reserve or psychiatric resilience being entirely 
and exclusively given in terms of specific low-
level sets of entities and their specific rela-
tions. We are not given, in other terms, or-
ganizational details required by a mechanis-
tic explanatory approach. The phenomena 
briefly reviewed in section 3 suggest that as-
pects such as education, occupation and IQ 
are involved insofar as they can affect the 
overall cognitive behaviour of the system in 
cases where stress/disturbance perturbs the 
system, and that they must therefore be rele-
vant when explaining disorders. Within the 
context of mechanistic scientific explanation, 
this cannot but lead to the idea that “organi-
zation” plays a fundamental role. But it also 
highlights the limits of decomposition or lo-
calizing strategies. In other terms, this kind 
of example, while not per se incompatible 
with any mechanistic account whatsoever, at 
least challenges some common ways of con-
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ceiving mechanisms and mechanistic expla-
nations as mental simulations of how a 
mechanism’s components behave to bring 
about the target phenomenon. I am not 
claiming that complete, maximally detailed 
causal knowledge should be sought in order 
to have an explanatory account, but rather 
arguing that how the underlying organization 
is related to the overall cognitive patterns de-
serves further clarification. While more de-
tails are not necessarily better, some deeper 
analysis is needed, to avoid “organization” 
from becoming a rather empty term in this 
context. We should avoid to  embrace a – so-
to-speak – «organization mysticism».28 
What aspects of organization should we 
focus on, so as to provide the most adequate 
and most tractable ones for explanatory pur-
poses? From a mechanistic perspective, or-
ganization has been defined as the «relation 
between a mechanism as a whole and its 
components», by virtue of which they 
«work together to do something».29 The 
three dimensions of dependence exhibited by 
the forms of organization that Kuorikoski 
and Ylikoski introduced (diversity in the 
kinds of components, the network structure 
between the components, and diversity in the 
kinds of relations) make sense in the cases 
addressed here. However, an understanding 
of behaviour in terms of properties of the 
whole and its constituent parts does not seem 
to provide sufficiently significant explanato-
ry clues – thus challenging the idea that a 
mechanistic approach to mental disorders is 
(always) the road to choose. The following 
issue is thorny: if we take it that lower levels 
are constitutive of the whole and therefore 
cannot be manipulated independently of 
higher levels, and that both the parts and the 
whole they constitute are neither independ-
ent existences nor related by causal relations, 
we are left with the problem of accounting 
for the differences in cognitive outcomes de-
spite (at least apparently) very similar under-
lying levels. Explanatory progress in mecha-
nistic terms would occur if, for instance, they 
shed light on the specific features, details and 
constraints of material realization that affect 
overall cognitive performance, given that 
(apparently) analogous levels are actually as-
sociated with very different behaviours. In 
principle, «by finding the basic constituents 
of organization, we find the things that, if 
changed, would lead to changes in the prop-
erty of the whole», while «the  properties of 
relations explain system-level behaviour if we 
can link changes in the specific properties of 
such relations [...] to specific changes in the 
system-level property».30 These attempts to 
clarify organization are challenged by the 
cases described, which seem to indicate that 
in fact the specific arrangement of constitu-
ents does not matter – or does not matter 
enough – to affect system-level behaviour, 
and cannot hence provide the best grounding 
for explanatory practices. 
Considering what relations are explanato-
rily relevant also requires taking a stance on 
the purpose of the explanation itself. As men-
tioned above, the interpretation and model-
ling of clinical situations in which cognitive 
reserve and psychiatric resilience play – or 
can play – a role are problematic due to diffi-
culties in producing accounts that are both 
accurate – in the sense of considering all the 
relevant factors and their mutual relations – 
and tractable – that is, most effectively em-
ployed in practice. Explaining mental disor-
ders also has to do with establishing what el-
ements are doing the work we are most inter-
ested in for clinical purposes. For instance, 
how do accommodation/compensation 
strategies affect the stability/instability of the 
system at stake (i.e. resulting in standard 
cognitive performance vs. disorder) so as to 
account for clinical conditions? Finally, 
which of the identified interactions between 
factors involved are the best targets for inter-
ventions that can improve health conditions 
under the circumstances? Addressing organi-
zation as resulting in resilient behaviours 
raises clinical issues, by directly affecting our 
decisions on whether to actively intervene or 
not in the functioning of the system at differ-
ent levels: when and to what extent should 
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clinical interventions be performed, or might 
resilience itself provide sufficient mitigation? 
In discussing organization, and its ex-
planatory role in mechanistic accounts, 
Kuorikoski and Ylikoski state that «the de-
termination relation between the properties 
of the parts and the whole is not a process in 
time».31 However, time and order seem to be 
highly relevant in the cases under considera-
tion. One striking feature that emerges in 
some studies is the differential functioning of 
what appear to be resilience-increasing fac-
tors in initial and subsequent stages of the 
disorder. For instance, it has been shown 
that, in cases of cognitive decline, high edu-
cation levels may initially constitute a protec-
tive factor but lead to accelerated decline af-
ter disease onset. Similarly, some longitudinal 
studies have shown that more years of educa-
tion and higher premorbid IQ correlate with 
the later onset of dementia symptoms; but 
after onset, cognitive decline is actually faster 
in patients with higher indices of cognitive 
reserve.32 So, not only do cognitive reserve 
factors change the behaviour of the system, 
these factors also themselves change in rela-
tions to changes in the functioning of the sys-
tem over time. They can play both a func-
tional role with respect to maintaining the 
normal organization of the system, and a dys-
functional role – as if, as has been hypothe-
sized, at some point the increasing neuropa-
thological load eventually overrides their 
protective effects.  
Studies thus suggest that resilience can 
give us hints as to how extensive a disturb-
ance a system can withstand before undergo-
ing a significant breakdown of its standard 
functioning. Is there a clear threshold that is 
eventually reached, finally cancelling the 
mismatch between expected cognitive per-
formance and actual cognitive performance? 
Is it possible to identify breakdown thresh-
olds at which conditions shift from non-
pathological to pathological? Establishing 
thresholds for the benefits of protective fac-
tors would allow us to optimize interventions 
or allow us to forego them if unnecessary or 
avoidable, from a perspective that would 
promote a strong focus on the capacity to re-
sist disease and the influence of life-long, dis-
tal and sometimes remote factors. Despite 
the presence in the literature of different op-
erational definitions of resilience, a general 
tenet that can be inferred from various appli-
cations of the concept is that resilience built 
earlier in life can act as a buffer against the 
harmful effects of future stressors and/or ad-
verse effects, with different individuals ex-
hibiting different thresholds in response to 
ongoing daily stressors.33 Studies on resili-
ence and cognitive reserve should provide 
hints as to what really holds the pieces to-
gether and is responsible for the behaviour of 
the system, defined as a set of interdependent 
components characterized by system-wide re-
sponses – which might not be most effectively 
expressed in mechanistic explanatory terms. 
Finally, as briefly anticipated above, let us 
stress how discourses on cognitive reserve 
and resilience also affect diagnosis. If cogni-
tive performance is not what would be ex-
pected, what should be taken as the hallmark 
of the pathology? Should we regard underly-
ing dysfunction or higher-level cognitive per-
formance as the determining factor? Which 
“orchestrated functioning” should we con-
sider when diagnosing? If the focus is on 
cognitive performance which can actually be 
observed, then we will not label the person 
under consideration as diseased and diagno-
sis will be delayed (given that reserve and re-
silience are temporary buffers). If, instead, 
we focus on the underlying neurobiological 
conditions, the person will be labelled as dis-
eased. Different answers to this question thus 
lead to a condition being assessed as patho-
logical or not, with clear clinical implications. 
In his discussion of complex systems, Wil-
liam Wimsatt has stressed that we need to 
decide which are the relevant components 
and levels with respect to the epistemic aim at 
stake. Plus, «we need to know more general-
ly how we should order and relate different 
descriptions of the behaviour of a system, 
particularly partial descriptions, to construct 
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explanatory accounts of its behaviour».34 In 
the recent philosophical debate on mechanis-
tic explanations, organizational explanations 
have been recruited to trace dependencies 
between organizational patterns and system-
level properties. It might be difficult not only 
to decipher whether one has accurately cap-
tured some, or possibly all, of the relevant rela-
tions, but also whether, in doing so, one has 
grasped the tractable ones. As has emerged 
from the above reflections, research on cogni-
tive reserve and psychiatric resilience bring 
important issues to the fore. It encourages us 
to reflect on what kind of knowledge would 
enable us to draw inferences regarding the dif-
ferent consequences of analogous systems in-
volving similar constituents, and the capacity 
of such systems to change and resist change. 
 
█  4 Concluding remarks 
 
In the sections above, we have shown that 
resilience presents challenges with respect to 
a mechanistic account of organization. This 
mechanistic account – and the crucial ex-
planatory role it has been granted in recent 
mechanistic theories – does not seem the 
most effective epistemological tool to clarify 
what elements should be counted as “respon-
sible” for the system’s behaviour in cases of 
cognitive reserve or psychiatric resilience. 
This might effectively impact explanatory 
attempts to identify stable patterns underly-
ing disorders. The challenge is related to the 
choice of what exactly organization has to 
specify to be considered genuinely explanato-
rily significant. It appears that accommoda-
tion strategies and resilient behaviour can 
hardly be represented in terms of discrete en-
tities, their mutual local interactions, and 
constitutive relations. 
It is a fundamental tenet of the mechanis-
tic framework that the organized activity of 
the constituent parts of a mechanism produce 
the very behaviour that characterises the tar-
get phenomenon, and that a mechanistic ex-
planation should describe the behaviour and 
organization of certain constituent entities. In 
the cases presented above, issues emerged as 
to how the organisation of the lower-level 
parts is exactly responsible for the global be-
haviour of the system. While I am overall well 
disposed towards mechanistic accounts, I 
have here stressed cases which suggest the 
need for correctives. Reserve and resilience 
shed some doubt on the adequacy and auton-
omy of mechanistic views for models of cogni-
tion and cognitive impairments, explanatory 
purposes and encourage further epistemologi-
cal debate along various lines. Let us conclude 
by mentioning some of these. 
To start with, resilience and reserve are 
usually presented as positive factors, but do 
they actually and necessarily provide an epis-
temic advantage given that they might make 
the disorder more difficult to detect? Or do 
they mask rather than shed light on the rele-
vant causal relations? One goal of explaining 
is to parse the network of interactions and 
pick out the most relevant relations – rela-
tions that might then also increase our power 
to predict and intervene effectively. Does 
taking resilience into account always provide 
an explanatory advantage (i.e. allow for a bet-
ter understanding of the system’s actual func-
tioning), or can the resulting systemic re-
arrangement in some cases mask explanatori-
ly relevant underlying causal relations? Does 
it hinder rather than facilitate comprehen-
sion, from a strictly epistemological point of 
view? Seeing no effect of a given variable 
doesn’t mean that the variable isn’t contrib-
uting to the behaviour of the system: other 
parts of the system could be compensating. 
In this sense, resilience can actually hamper 
the unravelling of underlying causal relations, 
temporarily masking important factors.  
Does psychiatric resilience work as a uni-
fying concept? On the one hand, the situa-
tion described is common to many patients; 
on the other, as already stressed, remarkable 
individual differences are observed. Studying 
phenomena currently classified as cognitive 
reserve and resilience can provide hints on 
underlying common systems that not only 
take proximal but also distal and remote con-
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tributing – or counteracting – factors into 
account from a life-long perspective. For in-
stance, Watson and Joyce claim that «an un-
derstanding of whether there is plasticity in 
the fronto-parietal system that can be modi-
fied by life experience would illuminate ap-
proaches to the cognitive remediation of 
both schizophrenia and dementia and have 
implications for health maintenance in the 
general public»,35 thus suggesting that trans-
diagnostic conclusions could be drawn from 
the maintenance of functionality. At the 
same time, exactly what resilient behaviour 
stands for – i.e. whether for a healthy or 
pathological condition, whether for a normal 
or an aberrant response – remains controver-
sial. Rutter, for instance, has suggested that 
depression itself is essentially an adaptation 
to adverse conditions, and, in this sense, a 
sign of resilience, rather than lack of resili-
ence.36 Clearly, open questions remain here 
too, in relation to the comprehensibility and 
manageability of adverse events. 
Finally, do cognitive reserve and psychiat-
ric resilience bring some prescriptive, rather 
than merely descriptive, stance with them? 
Given that resilience suggests a “better than 
expected outcome”, is it a normative-
flavoured concept, one that leads to a con-
versation about priorities (especially in the 
case of mental disorders, where socially ac-
ceptable/unacceptable behaviours are at is-
sue)? Is resilience therefore desirable, and 
should we think of resilience as a good thing 
to be promoted and enhanced?37 Answers to 
these questions and reflections on the possi-
ble prescriptive meaning of the notion will, 
again, also affect organizational explanatory 
accounts, the ways in which the boundaries 
of the system are defined, and the global be-
haviour to be pursued among multiple possi-
ble equilibria. Questions about the “resilience 
of what” – the exact boundaries of the multi-
level and multiscale resistance to change we 
are interested in – must then be accompanied 
by reflections on “resilience for whom” – dis-
cussing, especially in medical contexts, what 
the target functioning of the system might 
be. Hence investigations should be pursued 
to establish whether re-organization in resili-
ence/reserve cases means the ability to return 
– or strive to return – to some previous, pre-
disturbance state, or, rather, to adjust and 
promote a new functional state. Without 
denying the importance and explanatory use-
fulness of the notion of organization, all 
these reflections are thus meant to stress 
how, in psychological and psychiatric con-
texts, reserve and resilience, and the many 
different paths to resilient outcomes, encour-
age a debate which could touch upon organi-
zational mechanistic explanations, as well as 
definitions of disorder, diagnoses and thera-
peutic choices. 
 
█  Acknowledgments 
 
I am grateful to two anonymous referees 
for their comments and suggestions on a pre-
vious version of this paper. 
 
█  Notes 
 
1 J. WAKEFIELD, The concept of mental disorder. On 
the boundary between biological facts and social 
values, in: «American Psychologist», vol. XLVII, 
n. 3, 1992, pp. 373-388, here p. 373. 
2 D. MURPHY, Psychiatry and the concept of disease 
as pathology, in: M. BROOME, L. BORTOLOTTI 
(eds.), Psychiatry as cognitive neuroscience: Philo-
sophical perspectives, Oxford University Press, Ox-
ford 2009, pp. 103-117, here p. 103 and p. 113. 
3 Cf., e.g., D. MURPHY, Psychiatry and the concept 
of disease as pathology, cit.; D. MURPHY, The medi-
cal model and the philosophy of science, in: K.W.M. 
FULFORD, M. DAVIES, R.G.T. GIPPS, G. GRAHAM, 
J.Z. SADLER, G. STANGHELLINI, T. THORNTON 
(eds.), The Oxford handbook of philosophy and 
psychiatry, Oxford University Press, Oxford 2013, 
pp. 966-986; G. REPNIKOV, D. MURPHY, Saving 
the explananda, in: K. KENDLER, J. PARNAS (eds.) 
Philosophical issues in psychiatry IV, Oxford Uni-
versity Press, Oxford 2017, pp. 274-281. 
4 See https://www.nimh.nih.gov/research/research-
funded-by-nimh/rdoc/index.shtml 
5 T.R. INSEL, The NIMH Research Domain Criteria 
(RDoC) project: Precision medicine for psychiatry, in: 
«American Journal of Psychiatry», vol. CLXXI, n. 
 
Explanatory organization and psychiatric resilience 
 
139 
 
4, 2014, pp. 395-397, here p. 396 - italics added. 
6 B. CUTHBERT, The RDoC framework: facilitating 
transition from ICD/DSM to dimensional ap-
proaches that integrate neuroscience and psycho-
pathology, in: «World Psychiatry», vol. XIII, n. 1, 
2014, pp. 28-35, here p. 30 - italics added. 
7 On levels in psychiatric diseases see, e.g, J. 
CAMPBELL, Validity and the causal structure of a 
disorder, in: K. KENDLER, J. PARNAS (eds.), Philo-
sophical issues in psychiatry, vol. IV: Classification 
of psychiatric illness, Oxford University Press, Ox-
ford 2017, pp. 257-273. 
8 P. MACHAMER, L. DARDEN, C. CRAVER, Thinking 
about mechanisms, in: «Philosophy of Science», 
vol. LXVII, n. 1, 2000, pp. 1-25, here p. 1. 
9 W. BECHTEL, A. ABRAHAMSEN, Explanation: A 
mechanist alternative, in: «Studies in History and 
Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical Sciences», 
vol. XXXVI, n. 2, 2005, pp. 421-441, here p. 421. 
10 Cf. S. GLENNAN, The new mechanical philoso-
phy, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2017. See 
also P. ILLARI, J. WILLIAMSON, What is a mecha-
nism? Thinking about mechanisms across the sci-
ences, in: «European Journal for Philosophy of 
Science», vol. II, n. 1, 2012, pp. 119-135; D. 
KAPLAN, C. CRAVER, The explanatory force of dy-
namical and mathematical models in neuroscience: 
a mechanist perspective, in: «Philosophy of Sci-
ence», vol. LXXVIII, n. 4, 2011, pp. 601-627.  
11 A. LEVY, W. BECHTEL, Abstraction and the or-
ganization of mechanisms, in: «Philosophy of Sci-
ence», vol.  LXXX, n. 2, 2013, pp. 241-261, here 
p. 243 - italics added. 
12 J. KUORIKOSKI, P. YLIKOSKI, How organization 
explains, in: V. KARAKOSTAS, D. DIEKS (eds.), 
EPSA11 Perspective and foundational problems in 
philosophy of science, Springer, Dordrecht 2013, 
pp. 69-80, here p. 69. 
13 C. CRAVER, Explaining the brain, Oxford Uni-
versity Press, Oxford, 2007, p. 189.  
14 D. BARULLI, Y. STERN, Efficiency, capacity, com-
pensation, maintenance, plasticity: emerging con-
cepts in cognitive reserve, in: «Trends in Cognitive 
Sciences», vol. XVII, n. 10, 2013, pp. 502-509, 
here p. 502. 
15 Cf., e.g., Y. LEVI, Y. RASSOVSKY,  E. AGRANOV, M. 
SELA-KAUFMAN, E. VAKIL, Cognitive reserve compo-
nents as expressed in traumatic brain injury, in: 
«Journal of International Neuropsychological Soci-
ety», vol. XIX, n. 6, 2013, pp. 664-667; E.B. 
SCHNEIDER, S. SUR, V. RAYMONT, J. DUCKWORTH, 
R.G. KOWALSKI, D.T. EFRON, X. HUI, S. SELVARA-
 
 
JAH, H.L. HAMBRIDGE, R.D. STEVENS, Functional 
recovery after moderate/severe traumatic brain injury: 
a role for cognitive reserve?, in: «Neurology», vol. 
LXXXII, n. 18, 2014, pp. 1636-1642. 
16 Cf. S. CHANRAUD, A.-L. PITEL, E.M. MÜLLER-
OEHRING, A. PFEFFERBAUM, E.V. SULLIVAN, Re-
mapping the brain to compensate for impairment in 
recovering alcoholics, in: «Cerebral Cortex», vol. 
XXIII, n. 1, 2013, pp. 97-104. 
17 Cf. Y. STERN, Cognitive reserve in ageing and 
Alzheimer’s disease, in: «Lancet Neurology», vol. 
XI, n. 11, 2012, pp. 1006-1012. Studies include 
autopsies showing brain changes consistent with 
advanced Alzheimer’s disease. Other relevant 
works on cognitive reserve are, e.g, I. FORCADA, 
M. MUR, E. MORA, E. VIETA, D. BATRÉS-FAZ, M.J. 
PORTELLA, The influence of cognitive reserve on 
psychosocial and neuropsychological functioning in 
bipolar disorder, in: «European Neuropharma-
cology», vol. XXV, n. 2, 2015, pp. 214-222; I. 
GRANDE, J. SANCHEZ-MORENO, B. SOLE, E. 
JIMENEZ, C. TORRENT, C.M. BONNIN, C. VARO, R. 
TABARES-SEISDEDOS, V. BALANZA-MARTINEZ, E. 
VALLS, I. MORILLA, A.F. CARVALHO, J.L. AYUSO-
MATEOS, E. VIETA, A. MARTINEZ-ARAN, High cog-
nitive reserve in bipolar disorders as a moderator of 
neurocognitive impairment, in: «Journal of Affec-
tive Disorders», vol. CCVIII, 2017, pp. 621-627; 
C. HABECK, Q. RAZLIGHI, Y. GAZES, D. BARULLI, J. 
STEFFENER, Y. STERN, Cognitive reserve and brain 
maintenance: orthogonal concepts in theory and 
practice, in: «Cerebral Cortex», vol. XXVII, n. 8, 
2017, pp. 3962-3969. 
18 D. BARTRES-FAZ, E.M. ARENAZA-URQUIJO, Struc-
tural and functional imaging correlates of cognitive 
and brain reserve hypotheses in healthy and pathologi-
cal ageing, in: «Brain Topography», vol. XXIV, n. 
3-4, 2011, pp. 340-357, here p. 340 - italics added. 
19 For attempts to measure cognitive reserve, see 
e.g. B.R. REED, D. MUNGAS, S.T. FARIAS, D. HAR-
VEY, L. BECKETT, K. WIDAMAN, L. HINTON, C. 
DECARLI, Measuring cognitive reserve based on the 
decomposition of episodic memory variance, in: 
«Brain», vol. CXXXIII, Pt. 8, 2010, pp. 2196-
2209; L.B. ZAHODNE, J.J. MANLY, A.M. BRICK-
MAN, K.L. SIEDLECKI, C. DECARLI, Y. STERN, 
Quantifying cognitive reserve in older adults by de-
composing episodic memory variance: Replication 
and extension, in: «Journal of the International 
Neuropsychological Society», vol. XIX, n. 8, 
2013, pp. 854-862. 
20 It has been shown that when part of the fron-
 
  Campaner 
 
140 
 
to-parietal system is damaged, an increase in ac-
tivity occurs throughout the system. This could 
either reflect the use of different strategies or 
the recruitment of more cortex to compensate. 
See A. WOOLGAR, D. BOR, J. DUNCAN, Global 
increase in task-related fronto-parietal activity 
after focal frontal lobe lesion, in: «Journal of 
Cognitive Neuroscience», vol. XXV, n. 9, 2013, 
pp. 1542-1552. 
21 Cf. M.J. LIND, R.C. BROWN, C.M. SHEERIN, T.P. 
YORK, J.M. MYERS, K.S. KENDLER, A.B. AM-
STADTER, Does parenting influence the enduring 
impact of severe childhood sexual abuse on psychi-
atric resilience in adulthood?, in: «Child Psychia-
try & Human Development», vol. XLIX, n. 1, 
2018, pp. 33-41. Among the first relevant works 
on psychiatric resilience, see M. RUTTER, Resili-
ence in the face of adversity: Protective factors and 
resistance to psychiatric disorders, in: «The British 
Journal of Psychiatry», vol. CXLVII, 1985, pp. 
598-611. On psychiatric resilience being some-
thing different from the mere absence of disease, 
see A.M. ALMEDOM, D. GLANDON, Resilience is 
not the absence of PTSD any more than health is 
the absence of disease, in: «Journal of Loss and 
Trauma», vol. XII, n. 2, 2007, pp. 127-143. 
22 Cf., e.g., S. COLLISHAW, G. HAMMERTON, L. 
MAHEDY, R. SELLERS, M.J. OWEN, N. CRADDOCK, 
A.K. TAPAR, G.T. HAROLD, F. RICE, A. THAPAR  
Mental health resilience in the adolescent offspring 
of parents with depression: a prospective longitudi-
nal study, in: «Lancet Psychiatry», vol. III, n. 1, 
2016, pp. 49-57) consider high-risk adolescents 
(e.g. given severe parental depression) and show 
that child, family, social, and lifestyle factors to-
gether positively contribute to adolescent mental 
health resilience. 
23 Cf. E.C. LONG, S.L. LÖNN, J. LI, P. LICTHTEN-
STEIN, J. SUNDQVIST, K. SUNDQVIST, K.S. KENDLER, 
Resilience and risk for alcohol use disorders: a Swe-
dish twin study, in: «Alcoholism. Clinical & Exper-
imental Research», vol. XLI, n. 1, 2017, pp. 149-
155; S.R. HORN, D.S. CHARNEY, A. FEDER, Under-
standing resilience: New approaches for preventing 
and treating PTSD, in: «Experimental Neurolo-
gy», vol. CCLXXXIV, Pt. B, 2016, pp. 119-132. On 
genetic and environmental factors, and attempts to 
elaborate an integrative framework, see e.g. K.W. 
CHOI, M.B. STEIN, E.C. DUNN, K.C. KOENEN, J.W. 
SMOLLER, Genomics and psychological resilience: A 
research agenda, in «Molecular Psychiatry», vol. 
XXIV, n. 12, 2019, pp. 1770-1778. 
 
 
24 Cf., e.g., S.J. RUSSO, J.W. MURROUGH, MING-HU 
HAN, D.S. CHARNEY, E,J. NESTLER, Neurobiology of 
resilience, in: «Nature Neuroscience», vol. XV, n. 
11, 2012, pp. 1475-1484. A representation of the 
state of the art of neurobiological research on resil-
ience, and related difficulties, is provided in J.W. 
MURROUGH, S.J. RUSSO, The neurobiology of resili-
ence: complexity and hope, in: «Biological Psychia-
try», vol. LXXXVI, n. 6, 2019, pp. 406-409. 
25 Cf. A. WATSON, E. JOYCE, Cognitive reserve and 
neuropsychiatric disorders, in: «Current Opinion 
in Behavioral Sciences», vol. IV, 2015, pp. 142-
146. 
26 A. SHRIVASTAVA, A. DE SOUSA, P. LODHA, Resil-
ience as a psychopathological construct for psychiat-
ric disorders, in: Y.K. KIM (ed.) Frontiers in psychi-
atry. Artificial intelligence, precision medicine, and 
other paradigm shifts, Springer, Singapore 2019, 
pp. 479-489, here p. 479. 
27 Cf. A. LEVY, W. BECHTEL, Abstraction and the 
organization of mechanisms, in: «Philosophy of 
Science», vol.  LXXX, n. 2, 2013, pp. 241-261 
28 Y. KUORIKOSKI, P. YLIKOSKI, How organization 
explains, cit., p. 70. 
29 Cf. B. CLARKE, D. GILLIES, P. ILLARI, F. RUSSO, J. 
WILLIAMSON, Mechanisms and the evidence hier-
archy, in: «Topoi», vol. XXXIII, n. 2, 2014, pp. 
339-360. 
30 Y. KUORIKOSKI, P. YLIKOSKI, How organization 
explains, cit., pp. 74-75. 
31 Ibid., p. 71.  
32 Cf., e.g., A. SOLDAN, C. PETTIGREW, S. LI, M.C. 
WANG, A. MOGHEKAR, O.A. SELNES, M. ALBERT, 
R. O’BRIEN, BIOCARD RESEARCH TEAM Rela-
tionship of cognitive reserve and cerebrospinal fluid 
biomarkers to the emergence of clinical symptoms in 
preclinical Alzheimer’s disease, in: «Neurobiology 
of Aging», vol. XXXIV, n. 12, 2013, pp. 2827-
2834; S.R. RAPP, M.A. ESPELAND, J.E. MANSON, 
S.M. RESNICK, N.R. BRYAN, S. SMOLLER, L.H. 
COKER, L.S. PHILLIPS, M.L. STEFANICK, G.E. SAR-
TO, WOMEN’S HEALTH INITIATIVE MEMORY 
STUDY, Educational attainment, MRI changes, and 
cognitive function in older postmenopausal women 
from the Women’s Health Initiative Memory Study, 
in: «International Journal of Psychiatry in Medi-
cine», vol. XLVI, n. 2, 2013, pp. 121-143. 
33 Cf. C.M. SHEERING, M.J. LIND, E.A. BROWN, 
C.O. GARDNER, K.S. KENDLER, A.B. AMSTADTER, 
The impact of resilience and subsequent stressful 
life events on MDD and GAD, in: «Depress Anxie-
ty», vol. XXXV, n. 2, 2018, pp. 140-147. 
 
Explanatory organization and psychiatric resilience 
 
141 
 
34 W. WIMSATT, Re-Engineering philosophy for lim-
ited beings. Piecewise approximations to reality, 
Harvard University Press, Cambridge (MA) 2007, 
p. 161. 
35 A.  WATSON,  E.  JOYCE,  Cognitive reserve and 
neuropsychiatric disorders, cit., here p. 144. 
36 Cf. M. RUTTER, Resilience. Some conceptual con-
siderations, in: «Journal of Adolescent Health», 
vol. XIV, n. 8, 1993, pp. 626-631. See also H. 
THORÉN, Resilience as a unifying concept, in: «In- 
______ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ternational Studies in the Philosophy of Science», 
vol. XXVIII, n. 3, 2014, pp. 303-324. 
37 On the possible relations between descriptive, 
normative, and predictive notions of resilience, 
see L. OLSSON, A. JERNECK, H. THOREN, J. 
PERSSON, D. O’BYRNE, Why resilience is unappeal-
ing to social science: Theoretical and empirical in-
vestigations of the scientific use of resilience, in: 
«Science Advances», vol. I, n. 4, 2015, Art.Nr. 
e1400217 – doi: 10.1126/sciadv.1400217. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  Campaner 
 
142 
 
█  References 
 
ALMEDOM, A.M., GLANDON, D. (2007). Re-
silience is not the absence of PTSD any 
more than health is the absence of disease. 
In: «Journal of Loss and Trauma», vol. 
XII, n. 2, pp. 127-143. 
BARTRES-FAZ, D., ARENAZA-URQUIJO, E.M. 
(2011). Structural and functional imaging 
correlates of cognitive and brain reserve hy-
potheses in healthy and pathological ageing. 
In: «Brain Topography», vol. XXIV, n. 
3-4, pp. 340-357. 
BARULLI, D., STERN, Y. (2013). Efficiency, ca-
pacity, compensation, maintenance, plastic-
ity: emerging concepts in cognitive reserve. 
In: «Trends in Cognitive Sciences», vol. 
XVII, n. 10, pp. 502-509. 
BECHTEL, W., ABRAHAMSEN, A. (2005). Ex-
planation: A mechanist alternative. In: 
«Studies in History and Philosophy of 
Biological and Biomedical Sciences», vol. 
XXXVI, n. 2, pp. 421-441. 
CAMPBELL, J. (2017). Validity and the causal 
structure of a disorder. In: K. KENDLER, J. 
PARNAS (eds.), Philosophical issues in psy-
chiatry, vol. IV: Classification of psychiatric 
illness, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 
pp. 257-273. 
CHANRAUD, S., PITEL, A.-L., MÜLLER-
OEHRING, E.M., PFEFFERBAUM, A., SUL-
LIVAN, E.V. (2013). Remapping the brain 
to compensate for impairment in recovering 
alcoholics. In: «Cerebral Cortex», vol. 
XXIII, n. 1, pp. 97-104. 
CHOI, K.W., STEIN, M.B., DUNN, E.C., 
KOENEN, K.C., SMOLLER, J.W. (2019). 
Genomics and psychological resilience: A re-
search agenda. In: «Molecular Psychia-
try», vol. XXIV, n. 12, pp. 1770-1778. 
CLARKE, B., GILLIES, D., ILLARI, P., RUSSO, F. 
WILLIAMSON, J. (2014). Mechanisms and 
the evidence hierarchy. In: «Topoi», vol. 
XXXIII, n. 2, pp. 339-360. 
COLLISHAW, S., HAMMERTON, G., MAHEDY, 
L., SELLERS, R., OWEN, M.J., CRADDOCK, 
N., TAPAR, A.K., HAROLD, G.T., RICE, F., 
THAPAR, A. (2016). Mental health resili-
ence in the adolescent offspring of parents 
with depression: a prospective longitudinal 
study. In: «Lancet Psychiatry», vol. III, n. 
1, pp. 49-57. 
 
 
CRAVER, C. (2007). Explaining the brain, Ox-
ford University Press, Oxford. 
CUTHBERT, B. (2014). The RDoC framework: 
facilitating transition from ICD/DSM to 
dimensional approaches that integrate neu-
roscience and psychopathology. In: «World 
Psychiatry», vol. XIII, n. 1, pp. 28-35. 
FORCADA, I., MUR, M., MORA, E., VIETA, E., 
BATRÉS-FAZ, D., PORTELLA, M.J. (2015). 
The influence of cognitive reserve on psychoso-
cial and neuropsychological functioning in bi-
polar disorder. In: «European Neurophar-
macology», vol. XXV, n. 2, pp. 214-222. 
GLENNAN, S. (2017). The new mechanical phi-
losophy, Oxford University Press, Oxford. 
GRANDE, I., SANCHEZ-MORENO, J., SOLE, B., 
JIMENEZ, E., TORRENT, C., BONNIN, C.M., 
VARO, C., TABARES-SEISDEDOS, R., BAL-
ANZA-MARTINEZ, V., VALLS, E., MORILLA, 
I., CARVALHO, A.F., AYUSO-MATEOS, J.L., 
VIETA, E., MARTINEZ-ARAN, A. (2017). 
High cognitive reserve in bipolar disorders 
as a moderator of neurocognitive impair-
ment. In: «Journal of Affective Disor-
ders», vol. CCVIII, pp. 621-627. 
HABECK, C., RAZLIGHI, Q., GAZES, Y., BA-
RULLI, D., STEFFENER, J., STERN, Y. 
(2017). Cognitive reserve and brain 
maintenance: orthogonal concepts in theory 
and practice. In: «Cerebral Cortex», vol. 
XXVII, n. 8, pp. 3962-3969. 
HORN, S.R., CHARNEY, D.S., FEDER, A. 
(2016). Understanding resilience: New ap-
proaches for preventing and treating PTSD. 
In: «Experimental Neurology», vol. 
CCLXXXIV, Pt. B, pp. 119-132. 
ILLARI, P., WILLIAMSON, J. (2012). What is a 
mechanism? Thinking about mechanisms 
across the sciences. In: «European Journal 
for Philosophy of Science», vol. II, n. 1, pp. 
119-135. 
INSEL, T.R. (2014). The NIMH Research Do-
main Criteria (RDoC) project: Precision 
medicine for psychiatry. In: «American 
Journal of Psychiatry», vol. CLXXI, n. 4, 
pp. 395-397. 
KAPLAN, D., CRAVER, C. (2011). The explan-
atory force of dynamical and mathematical 
models in neuroscience: a mechanist per-
spective. In: «Philosophy of Science», vol. 
LXXVIII, n. 4, pp. 601-627.  
KUORIKOSKI, J., YLIKOSKI, P. (2013). How 
 
Explanatory organization and psychiatric resilience 
 
143 
 
organization explains. In: V. KARAKO-
STAS, D. DIEKS (eds.), EPSA11 Perspective 
and foundational problems in philosophy of 
science, Springer, Dordrecht, pp. 69-80. 
LEVI, Y., RASSOVSKY, Y., AGRANOV, E., SELA-
KAUFMAN, M., VAKIL, E. (2013). Cogni-
tive reserve components as expressed in 
traumatic brain injury. In: «Journal of In-
ternational Neuropsychological Society», 
vol. XIX, n. 6, pp. 664-667. 
LEVY, A., BECHTEL, W. (2013). Abstraction 
and the organization of mechanisms. In: 
«Philosophy of Science», vol.  LXXX, n. 
2, pp. 241-261. 
LIND, M.J., BROWN, R.C., SHEERIN, C.M., 
YORK, T.P., MYERS, J.M., KENDLER, K.S., 
AMSTADTER, A.B. (2018). Does parenting 
influence the enduring impact of severe 
childhood sexual abuse on psychiatric resil-
ience in adulthood?. In: «Child Psychiatry 
& Human Development», vol. XLIX, n. 
1, pp. 33-41. 
LONG, E.C., LÖNN, S.L., LI, J., LICTHTENSTEIN, 
P., SUNDQVIST, J., SUNDQVIST, K., 
KENDLER, K.S. (2017). Resilience and risk for 
alcohol use disorders: A Swedish twin study. 
In: «Alcoholism. Clinical & Experimental 
Research», vol. XLI, n. 1, pp. 149-155. 
MACHAMER, P., DARDEN, L., CRAVER, C. 
(2000). Thinking about mechanisms, in: 
«Philosophy of Science», vol. LXVII, n. 1, 
pp. 1-25. 
MURPHY, D. (2009). Psychiatry and the con-
cept of disease as pathology. In: M. 
BROOME, L. BORTOLOTTI (eds.), Psychia-
try as cognitive neuroscience: Philosophical 
perspectives, Oxford University Press, Ox-
ford, pp. 103-117. 
MURPHY, D. (2013). The medical model and 
the philosophy of science. In: K.W.M. FUL-
FORD ET AL. (eds.), The Oxford handbook 
of philosophy and psychiatry, Oxford Uni-
versity Press, Oxford, pp. 966-986. 
MURROUGH, J.W., RUSSO, S.J. (2019). The 
neurobiology of resilience: complexity and 
hope. In: «Biological Psychiatry», vol. 
LXXXVI, n. 6, pp. 406-409. 
OLSSON, L., JERNECK, A., THOREN, H., 
PERSSON, J., O’BYRNE, D. (2015). Why re-
silience is unappealing to social science: 
Theoretical and empirical investigations of 
the scientific use of resilience. In: «Science 
 
 
Advances», vol. I, n. 4, 2015, Art. Nr. 
e1400217 – doi: 10.1126/sciadv.1400217. 
RAPP, S.R., ESPELAND, M.A., MANSON, J.E., 
RESNICK, S.M., BRYAN, N.R., SMOLLER, S., 
COKER, L.H., PHILLIPS, L.S., STEFANICK, 
M.L., SARTO, G.E., WOMEN’S HEALTH IN-
ITIATIVE MEMORY STUDY (2013). Educa-
tional attainment, MRI changes, and cogni-
tive function in older postmenopausal 
women from the Women’s Health Initiative 
Memory Study. In: «International Journal 
of Psychiatry in Medicine», vol. XLVI, n. 
2, pp. 121-143. 
REED, B.R., MUNGAS, D., FARIAS, S.T., HAR-
VEY, D., BECKETT, L., WIDAMAN, K., HIN-
TON, L., DECARLI, C. (2010). Measuring 
cognitive reserve based on the decomposition 
of episodic memory variance. In: «Brain», 
vol. CXXXIII, Pt. 8, pp. 2196-2209. 
REPNIKOV, G., MURPHY, D. (2017). Saving 
the explananda. In: K. KENDLER, J. PAR-
NAS (eds.) Philosophical issues in psychia-
try IV, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 
pp. 274-281. 
RUSSO, S.J., MURROUGH, J.W., HAN, M.-H., 
CHARNEY, D.S., NESTLER, E.J. (2012). Neu-
robiology of resilience. In: «Nature Neuro-
science», vol. XV, n. 11, pp. 1475-1484. 
RUTTER, M. (1985). Resilience in the face of 
adversity: Protective factors and resistance 
to psychiatric disorders. In: «The British 
Journal of Psychiatry», vol. CXLVII, pp. 
598-611. 
RUTTER, M. (1993). Resilience. Some conceptu-
al considerations. In: «Journal of Adoles-
cent Health», vol. XIV, n. 8, pp. 626-631. 
SCHNEIDER, E.B., SUR, S., RAYMONT, V., 
DUCKWORTH, J., KOWALSKI, R.G., 
EFRON, D.T., HUI, X., SELVARAJAH, S., 
HAMBRIDGE, H.L., STEVENS, R.D. (2014). 
Functional recovery after moderate/severe 
traumatic brain injury: a role for cognitive 
reserve?. In: «Neurology», vol. LXXXII, 
n. 18, pp. 1636-1642. 
SHEERING, C.M., LIND, M.J., BROWN, E.A., 
GARDNER, C.O., KENDLER, K.S., AM-
STADTER, A.B. (2018). The impact of resil-
ience and subsequent stressful life events on 
MDD and GAD. In: «Depress Anxiety», 
vol. XXXV, n. 2, pp. 140-147. 
SHRIVASTAVA, A., DE SOUSA, A., LODHA, P. 
(2019). Resilience as a psychopathological 
 
  Campaner 
 
144 
 
construct for psychiatric disorders. In: Y.K. 
KIM (ed.) Frontiers in psychiatry. Artificial 
intelligence, precision medicine, and other 
paradigm shifts, Springer, Singapore, pp. 
479-489. 
SOLDAN, A., PETTIGREW, C., LI, S., WANG, 
M.C., MOGHEKAR, A., SELNES, O.A., AL-
BERT, M., O’BRIEN, R., BIOCARD RE-
SEARCH TEAM (2013). Relationship of cog-
nitive reserve and cerebrospinal fluid bi-
omarkers to the emergence of clinical symp-
toms in preclinical Alzheimer’s disease. In: 
«Neurobiology of Aging», vol. XXXIV, 
n. 12, pp. 2827-2834. 
STERN, Y. (2012). Cognitive reserve in ageing 
and Alzheimer’s disease. In: «Lancet Neu-
rology», vol. XI, n. 11, pp. 1006-1012. 
THORÉN, H. (2014). Resilience as a unifying 
concept. In: «International Studies in the 
Philosophy of Science», vol. XXVIII, n. 3, 
pp. 303-324. 
WAKEFIELD, J. (1992). The concept of mental 
disorder. On the boundary between biological  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
facts and social values. In: «American Psy-
chologist», vol. XLVII, n. 3, pp. 373-388. 
WATSON, A., JOYCE, E. (2015). Cognitive re-
serve and neuropsychiatric disorders. In: 
«Current Opinion in Behavioral Scienc-
es», vol. IV, pp. 142-146. 
WIMSATT, W. (2007). Re-Engineering philos-
ophy for limited beings. Piecewise approxi-
mations to reality, Harvard University 
Press, Cambridge (MA). 
WOOLGAR, A., BOR, D., DUNCAN, J. (2013). 
Global increase in task-related fronto-
parietal activity after focal frontal lobe le-
sion. In: «Journal of Cognitive Neurosci-
ence», vol. XXV, n. 9, pp. 1542-1552. 
ZAHODNE, L.B., MANLY, J.J., BRICKMAN, 
A.M., SIEDLECKI, K.L., DECARLI, C., 
STERN, Y. (2013). Quantifying cognitive re-
serve in older adults by decomposing episod-
ic memory variance: Replication and exten-
sion. In: «Journal of the International 
Neuropsychological Society», vol. XIX, n. 
8, pp. 854-862. 
